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RECENT DECISIONS
present case, however, the Court of Appeals accepts as well-
established the principle that whether or not the park is operated for
a profit, the city is acting in a quasi-private or corporate capacity.
This seems to limit the force of the dictum in the Whittaker case,
since liability was imposed despite the fact that no entrance fees were
charged at the time the injury occurred.
It appears from this opinion that the court broadened the scope
of municipal liability to what is perhaps an unreasonable degree.17
This decision follows a noticeable, though unfortunate, trend toward
an extension of municipal tort liability s8 -unfortunate, since it may
result in discouraging small and impecunious municipalities from
providing recreational facilities. With the tendency toward a de-
crease in governmental immunity, the ultimate burden upon the tax-
payers will be increased, since they will 1ay not only for the super-
vision of parks, but also for injuries resulting from a lack of it.
M
ToRTs-REs IPSA LOQUITUR-EXPLODING BEVERAGE BOTTLE.-
Plaintiff was injured when a beer bottle, which she had selected from
a shelf in defendant's self-service store, exploded in her hands. In
an action to recover damages, plaintiff alleged breach of warranty
and negligence. The Appellate Division, reversing a dismissal of
the complaint, held that an inference of negligence arises when a cus-
tomer is injured by the unexpected dangerous behavior of an article
which was hitherto in the exclusive possession of a store owner.
Day v. Grand Union Co., 280 App. Div. 253, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 436
(3d Dep't 1952).
Actions for damages for injuries caused by exploding bottles
are generally based either on breach of implied warranty or on neg-
ligence. The implied warranties-merchantability 1 and fitness for
use 2-- arise only after there has been a contract of sale or transfer
of title,3 and may be enforced only by those in privity of contract.4
'1 See Caldwell v. Village of Island Park, 304 N. Y. 268, 276, 107 N. E. 2d
441, 445 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
is See Duren v. City of Binghamton, 172 Misc. 580, 583, 15 N. Y. S. 2d
518, 521 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 258 App. Div. 694, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 518 (3d
Dep't), affd, 283 N. Y. 467, 28 N. E. 2d 918 (1940) ; see Note, 23 ST. JoHN's
L. Rxv. 117 (1948).
IN. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 96(2). "Where the goods are bought by de-
scription from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be
the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the
goods shall be of merchantable quality." UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(2).2 N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 96(1). "Where the buyer, expressly or by
implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the
goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill orjudgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(1).
3 Bunday v. Columbus Machine Co., 143 Mich. 10. 106 N. W. 397 (1906);
Steams v. Drake, 24 P. I. 272, 52 Atl. 1082 (1902) ; Naumann v. Wehle Brew-
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No implied warranty is deemed to exist where a bottle explodes in
the hands of a customer in a self-service store, since the mere selec-
tion of a bottle from a display does not give rise to a contract of sale,
nor to a transfer of title in the usual sense.5 However, the concurring
opinion in the instant case stated that recovery may be had on the
warranty theory, since possession of the bottle by a customer who
intends to purchase it was felt to be equivalent to a delivery giving
rise to a contract of sale. 6
The aggrieved customer can also proceed on a negligence theory,
but as a consequence of this a problem of'proof arises. To lessen
the plaintiff's concededly difficult burden of establishing negligence,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes invoked. 7  This rule of
evidence 8 permits an inference that the defendant was negligent
where the facts indicate that the mishap occurred only because the
person in exclusive control 9 of the injurious instrumentality had
failed in some duty.'0
ing Co., 127 Conn. 44, 15 A. 2d 181 (1940); see Osborn v. Gantz, 60 N. Y.
540, 543 (1875). See 1 WirzasToN, SALES 464 (Rev. ed. 1948).
4 Campo v. Scofield, 301 N. Y. 468, 95 N. E. 2d 803 (1950); Turner v.
Edison Storage Battery Co., 248 N. Y. 73, 161 N. E. 423 (1928); Billington
v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 106 N. Y. S. 2d 129 (Schenectady Co. Ct. 1951);
Timpson v. Marshal, Meadows & Stewart, Inc., 198 Misc. 1034, 101 N. Y. S.
2d 583 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ; Commissioners v. Humm, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 875 (Sup.
Ct. 1944), aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 657, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 461 (1st Dep't),
appeal denied, 294 N. Y. 777, 61 N. E. 2d 782 (1945).
5 Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65 N. E. 2d 305
(1946) ; Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A. 2d 24 (1949). In the usual gro-
cery store sale, title passes when there is the simultaneous delivery of the goods
to the purchaser, and payment of the price to the vendor. 2 WILLISTON, SALES
333 (Rev. ed. 1948).
6 See Day v. Grand Union Co., 280 App. Div. 253, 255, 113 N. Y. S. 2d
436, 438 (3d Dep't 1952) (concurring opinion) ; see Note, Technical Require-
ments of Contract in Warranty Recovery, 41 ILL. L. REv. 676 (1947).
7 See Note, 22 ST. JonN's L. Rav. 128 (1947).
sSee, e.g., Feldman v. Chicago Ry., 289 IIl. 25, 124 N. E. 334, 338-9
(1919); Foltis v. City of New York, 287 N. Y. 108, 115-116, 38 N. E. 2d
455, 460 (1941) ; Judd v. Sams, 270 App. Div. 981, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 678 (4th
Dep't), aff'd inein., 296 N. Y. 801, 71 N. E. 2d 772 (1947).
9 McGillivray v. Great Northern Ry., 138 Minn. 278, 164 N. W. 922
(1917); Murray v. Great A. & P. Co., 236 App. Div. 477, 260 N. Y. Supp.
132 (4th Dep't 1932); cf. Francey v. Rutland R. R., 222 N. Y. 482, 119 N. E.
86 (1912).
10 The classic statement of the doctrine is found in Scott v. London and
St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596, 601, 159 Eng. Rep. 665, 667 (1865);
the New York statement of res ipsa loquitur is found in Foltis v. City of New
York, supra note 8 at 117, 38 N. E. 2d at 460. See also Cohn v. United Air
Lines Transportation Co., 17 F. Supp. 865 (D. Wyo. 1937) (sudden air cur-
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Courts have been hesitant to apply res ipsa loquitur in exploding
bottle cases where the defendant is the manufacturer, since the bottle
has left his exclusive control prior to the time of the accident."' Fur-
thermore, it is highly probable that others have mishandled the con-
tainer,'12 or that it was subjected to rapid temperature changes. 13 On
the other hand, an inference of negligence has been permitted against
the manufacturer where the evidence precluded the possibility of
negligent handling by others,' 4 or showed that like explosions oc-
curred within a short period of time.15 Similarly, this theory was
applied where the bottles were poorly constructed.16
Res ipsa loquitur generally is not invoked against the retailer
where there is no apparent reason for the bottle's explosion, since the
explosion, in itself, does not necessarily indicate that the defendant
was careless.17 Furthermore, it has been said that if, upon reason-
able inspection of the bottle before offering it for sale, no defects
are discovered, the retailer has discharged the duty of care owed to
his customers.' 8 Therefore, if a customer is subsequently injured as
a result of a latent defect in the article, the retailer is not liable.' 9
However, in the case under discussion, an inference of negligence
was permitted on mere proof of the explosion of the bottle in the
hands of a customer in a self-service store. The Court said that a
rents or air pockets could reasonably explain airplane accident); Galbraith v.
Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 196 N. E. 36 (1935) (latent defects in the automobile
could reasonably explain the accident).
"1Slack v. Premier-Pabst Corp., 40 Del. 97, 5 A. 2d 516 (1939); Curley
v. Ruppert, 272 App. Div. 441, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 578 (1st Dep't 1947) ; see Dail
v. Taylor, 151 N. C. 284, 66 S. E. 135, 137 (1909); Winifree v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, 191 Tenn. App. 144, 83 S. W. 2d 903, 906 (1935). But cf.
Joly v. Jones, 115 Vt. 174, 55 A. 2d 181, 186 (1947).
12 Kees v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 225 S. W. 2d 169 (Kan. City
Ct. App. 1949).
13 See Stewart v. Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 50 Ariz. 60, 68 P. 2d
952, 956 (1937) ; Wheeler v. Laurel Bottling Works, 111 Miss. 442, 71 So. 743,
744 (1916). The change, of course, must be a sudden raising of the tempera-
ture, since lowering it would reduce pressure in the bottle. See Bubble Up
Bottling Co. v. Lewis, 163 S. W. 2d 875, 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
14 Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S. E. 1087
(1912); Bradley v. Conway Springs Bottling Co., 154 Kan. 282, 118 P. 2d
601 (1941).
15 Shelton v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 214 Ky. 118, 282 S. W. 778 (1926);
Dail v. Taylor, 151 N. C. 284, 66 S. E. 135 (1909).
1' Willey v. Mynderse, 165 App. Div. 620, 151 N. Y. Supp. 280 (3d Dep't
1915).
17 Noonan v. Great A. & P. Co., 104 N. J. L. 136, 139 Atl. 9 (1927);
Burnham v. Lincoln, 225 Mass. 408, 114 N. E. 715 (1917); Bruckel v. Milhau's
Son, 116 App. Div. 832, 102 N. Y. Supp. 395 (2d Dep't 1907); Glaser v. Sietz,
35 Misc. 341, 71 N. Y. Supp. 942 (Sup. Ct. 1901) (res ipsa loquitur not specifi-
cally mentioned in the last three cases).
18 See Bruckel v. Milhau's Son, supra note 17 at 837-838, 102 N. Y. Supp.
at 399; see PRossaa, ToRTs 684 (1941); REsTATEmENT, ToRTs §§ 401, 402
(1948 Supp.).
19 See note 17 supra.
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defendant could not assume that he need make no explanation for
the injury on his premises, nor could he avoid liability by relying on
his trust in the manufacturer, or on the absence of a contract with
the customer.2 0
The Court apparently realized the plaintiff's difficulty in estab-
lishing his prima facie case in these situations, and extended the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur in an attempt to achieve an equitable result.
As a result, a customer stands a better chance of getting compensated
for his injuries; but, by the same token, a heavier burden is cast upon
the retailer. The local grocer, under this rule, has a greater duty to
inspect articles purchased for resale, a duty so strict that, perhaps,
he has become an insurer of the safety of those who enter his store.
)X
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS-LABOR UNIONS-LIABILITY
FOR DEFAMATION.-Plaintiff brought an action against defendants
individually and in their representative capacities as officers of a labor
union (the latter action pursuant to statute),' for damages resulting
from the publication of libelous material in the union newspaper. The
complaint did not allege that the individual members of the union
had authorized the tort. The lower court denied a motion to dismiss
the complaint against the defendants as individuals, but granted the
motion to dismiss it as against defendants in their representative
capacities. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and held that the statute
is procedural in nature and does not change the substantive liability
of the individual members which must be shown before the action
may be brought against the association officers. Martin v. Curran,
303 N. Y. 276, 101 N. E. 2d 683 (1951).
Courts have long taken cognizance of the common law rule that
an unincorporated association has no legal existence apart from that
of its members, 2 and, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, can-
not be sued as a separate entity.3 Its tort liability, therefore, is predi-
2
o Day v. Grand Union Co., 280 App. Div. 253, 255, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 436,
438 (3d Dep't 1952).
1 N. Y. Gzx. Ass'N LAW § 13.2 See Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated W.L.U. No. 131, 165 Ind.
421, 75 N. E. 877, 878 (1905); St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders'
Union No. 37, 94 Minn. 351, 102 N. W. 725, 727 (1905) ; see Fahy, The Union
i, Court, 37 ILr_ BAR J. 203 (1949).
3 St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union No. 37, supra note
2; see Saxer v. Democratic County Committee of Erie Co., 161 Misc. 35, 37,
291 N. Y. Supp. 18, 21 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Williams v. United Mine Workers
of America, 294 Ky. 520, 172 S. W. 2d 202, 204 (1943), af'd, 298 Ky. 117,
182 S. W. 2d 237 (1944) ; Pearson v. Anderburg, 28 Utah 495, 80 Pac. 307,
309 (1905).
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